During a rally yesterday, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden spoke to a crowd in Derry, N.H., a town that many miners call home. He acknowledged the economic setbacks and job insecurity that coal miners face these days, and gave them some advice: learn to code.
According to Dave Weigel of the Washington Post, Biden said, “Anybody who can go down 3,000 feet in a mine can sure as hell learn to program as well... Anybody who can throw coal into a furnace can learn how to program, for God’s sake!”
According to Weigel, the comment was met with silence from the audience.
Biden's campaignhas proposed moving the U.S. away from fossil fuels to reduce the country’s carbon footprint. He advocates helping lifelong miners secure sustainable jobs and keep their benefits.His plancalls for a 'Task Force on Coal and Power Plant Communities' to reinvigorate communities that depend on mining and coal as their economic backbone. The plan would invest in assets of mining communities, "like a rich culture, natural beauty, a proven workforce, and entrepreneurial spirit."
Retraining programshave received bipartisan support. The U.S. Department of Labor announced a fund of nearly $5 million for working training programs in Appalachia earlier this year. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) recently announced $2 million in funding from the National Dislocated Workers fund, and Senator Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) announced a fund of more than $1 million from the same fund.
Although they are often touted as a solution,retraining programs have a questionable record of success.Some displaced coal workers do transition into other fields or industries, but critics say that the jobs that former coal workers usually find tend to pay only $12 to $15 dollars per hour as opposed to the approximate $75,000 a year salary that coal workers had while working in the mines.
Josh Benton, the deputy secretary of the Education and Workforce Development Cabinet in mining-heavy Kentucky,told Ohio Valley ReSource that the biggest problem is whether or not workers actually have other jobs based out of where they live.
“The challenge that we face is not necessarily are the training programs effective? It is, are there other industries, for those displaced workers to go to work,”he said.
“I think that job training keeps being promoted because it solves a political problem both for elected officials and for employers, but it doesn’t do anything for the economics,”Gordon Lafer, a University of Oregonprofessor and author of “The Job Training Charade” told Ohio Valley ReSource. Instead, Lafer recommended training people and investing in industries that have to stay local. He mentioned healthcare, construction, education, and tourism as promising fields.
The need for a solution for coal miners continues. Although the industry added 4,500 jobs from 2016 to 2018, U.S. coal production decreased by 10 percent in 2019 and jobs are at risk.
President Michel Temer issued a presidential decree in 2017 to open up the vast 4.6 million hectare (17,800 square mile) RENCA preserve in the northern Amazon to mining. Meeting with a firestorm of criticism he abandoned the effort. Sources now say the Bolsonaro administration is poised to quietly revive plans to open RENCA in 2020.
Likewise, with Bolsonaro in charge, transnational mining companies are pushing for a change in Brazilian law allowing the firms to mine inside protected lands and indigenous reserves across the nation. The change could be introduced in 2020 via the mining law, a bill long stalled in Congress.
Should mines in RENCA and elsewhere go ahead, transport will be needed. The planned Ferrovia Pará railway (Fepasa) would move commodities from Pará state’s interior for river transport to the coast. Other plans call for 20+ new river ports, 2 thermoelectric power stations, and a transmission line crossing Pará.
However, all these major projects face a legal hurdle. The Brazilian Constitution states that no major measure can be authorized allowing mining in indigenous areas, or large new infrastructure projects approved before prerequisites are satisfied, including consent of affected indigenous and traditional communities.
An industrial mining operation in Brazil. Note the forest at the edge of the open pit mine. Photo credit: Norsk Hydro ASA via VisualHunt.com / CC BY-NC-SA
For decades, since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, Brazil’s government has struggled to strike a balance in the Amazon between moneyed ruralist interests allied with transnational agribusiness and mining companies, and their opposition — indigenous peoples, conservationists, and traditional riverine, minority and landless communities.
But Jair Bolsonaro’s government is proving to be a game changer — an administration uninterested in balance or compromise, and seeming not to care about world opinion or reputation, going its own way. It has already approved, or is moving toward approving, a slate of initiatives aimed at deregulating the environment and cancelling out many social gains, while generating an unprecedented expansion of land grabbing, agribusiness and industrial mining.
This is the second of two articles in which Mongabay surveys examples of key measures carried out so far, along with what may lay ahead. The first article concentrated on land grabbing and agribusiness, the main focus in this story is the administration’s alliance with mining interests.
Forest and topsoil must be removed before ore can be mined at Brazil’s Norsk Hydro ASA Paragominas open pit mine. Photo credit: Norsk Hydro ASA via VisualHunt / CC BY-NC-SA.
Opening RENCA
When President Michel Temer issued a presidential decree in August 2017 to open up the vast 4.6 million hectare (17,800 square mile) RENCA preserve in the northern Amazon to mining, he met with a firestorm of criticism. RENCA (the National Copper and Associated Reserve) is in Amapá, Brazil’s most northern state, where it borders on Pará. The military set it up in 1984, not to protect the rainforest but to stop transnational mining companies from plundering the country’s resources.
But RENCA’s establishment served conservation needs anyway. Almost all of it (95 percent) is protected today, with seven conservation units and two indigenous reserves. Only 0.3 percent has been deforested, making it one of the Amazon’s most intact rainforests. So it wasn’t surprising that environmentalists were outraged by Temer’s sudden move.
The roar of national and global disapproval caused a federal judge to annul Temer’s decree, ruling that Brazil’s 1988 constitution did not permit the preserve to be abolished by the president, but only through legislative action.
Now, with the ruralists more powerful than ever in Congress and Bolsonaro running things, observers say it is only a matter of time before the government teams up with mining interests to have another go. Indications are, according to Mongabay sources, that they are preparing to act early in 2020.
RENCA is a tantalizing prize. The mineral wealth lying beneath its pristine forests is mind-boggling, with estimated reserves of gold, iron, phosphate, titanium, manganese, niobium and tantalum. “Studies carried out in the 1970s said that [RENCA’s] minerals were worth US$1 trillion,” Senator Lucas Barreto, a chief advocate of opening up the preserve, told the El Pais newspaper. “Imagine how much that is in today’s values.”
Although the generals in power in the early 1980s adopted nationalist policies, particularly in industry, they were also keen to attract foreign mining companies. The creation of RENCA was in some ways an exception. According to the BBC, the British mining company, BP, wanted to mine RENCA, but Rear Admiral Roberto Gama e Silva, a staunch nationalist, told the powerful National Security Council that ceding the mining rights to BP might further the interests of the American, Daniel Ludwig, then one of the richest men in the world, who was at that time opening the Jari agro-industrial project nearby. As a result, mining’s entrée into RENCA was vetoed.
A satellite view of the Carajás iron mine in Pará state near the city of Marabá. It is run by Brazil’s Vale mining company. Mining, if not properly managed, can do significant environmental and social harm, polluting rivers and groundwater, deforesting large areas, and displacing indigenous and traditional communities. Image courtesy of NASA
Mining companies have been lobbying since then to end this prohibition, with Canadian firms, in particular, eager to get access to RENCA. Sen. Barreto recently revealed that Bolsonaro has told him that a new version of Temer’s RENCA decree is being prepared. Other presidential sources confirm that action will be taken soon.
There will, again, undoubtedly be protests. “Everyone I have spoken to is horrified at the prospect of abolishing RENCA,” said Randolfe Rodrigues, leader of the Senate opposition, while in Madrid for the COP25 climate summit in December. It seems likely, too, that once again the legality of the decree will be challenged in court, where the outcome is uncertain.
People who know the region well are worried about the impact, not only from the mines, but from the collateral damage that opening up RENCA will do to indigenous communities, traditional populations and the forest. “To gain access to most of the minerals, they’ll have to create a new logistics, with roads, railways, electric energy,” said Décio Yokota, assistant executive of the not-for-profit Institute for Research and Indigenous Training (IEPÉ).
The Bolsonaro government has already made behind the scenes efforts to fast track the long delayed Manaus-Boa Vista powerline through the Waimiri-Atroari Indigenous Territory that would supply electricity from the Tucurui hydroelectric dam to new mines and energy-hungry ore processing plants in RENCA. A proposal floated seemingly out of leftfield at the start of the administration to extend the BR-163 north to the Surinam border could be part of the plan too, though not directly linked to the opening up of RENCA, which is located much farther to the east.
Yokata says that large-scale infrastructure projects like those being considered for RENCA leave only desolation in their wake. “Big hydroelectric dams and mining companies destroy, exploit, extract and leave — and when they leave, they leave nothing behind but their destruction. They don’t generate local wealth,” he said. Instead, he said, the government should invest in sustainable projects that don’t destroy the forest.
Mines produce massive amounts of waste, much of it toxic. That waste comes in solid form, as slag, and also in liquid, which must be stored in pools behind dams. The conservation of rainforest within indigenous reserves would be incompatible with industrial mining. Photo by James Martins licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
Thousands of mining claims already mapped
Meanwhile, with Bolsonaro in charge, mining companies are pushing for a change in Brazilian law that would allow them not only to mine in one preserve, however large and rich, but also on protected and indigenous land throughout the nation. Such a change could be introduced via the mining law long stalled in Congress.
However, a serious legal hurdle stands in the way. The Brazilian Constitution states that no measure can be authorized to allow mining in indigenous areas before a series of prerequisites are satisfied, including the consent of the affected communities.
According to the jurist and former president of the indigenous agency, FUNAI, Carlos Marés, this means that all indigenous people in Brazil must be consulted, in accordance with the guidelines established in the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, of which Brazil is a signatory. In practice, such approval would seem remote or even impossible.
The government has not yet indicated how it intends to resolve this conundrum. Even so, the National Agency of Mining (ANM), the body responsible for Brazilian mining, has accepted initial proposals from companies for mining in 48 indigenous territories, concessions whose borders have been well mapped.
In late November, the Public Federal Ministry (MPF), a group of federal and state independent litigators, called on the ANM to throw out these proposals until the legal requirements under the Constitution have been met. The ANM argued in return that it can authorize initial studies, provided that the mining itself doesn’t begin until all legal demands are satisfied.
The MPF disagrees, saying that these advance claims indirectly help the mining companies. “Even though these legal procedures don’t by themselves cause socio-environmental damage, they help produce a raft of ‘documents’ that create the appearance of legality for artisanal mining,” stated the MPF. “These documents are used on the ground as a means of keeping the [artisanal] mine[s] open, recruiting laborers, contracting services and even deceiving the Indians.”
According to the Socioenvironmental Institute (ISA), an NGO, mining companies have registered 3,347 requests for mining rights in seven Amazonian states — Acre, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins. They involve 131 reserves. The lion’s share of the claims are in Pará state, with 2,266 requests.
The 554 mile Carajás railroad that annually hauls 120 million tons of iron ore from the huge Carajás iron mine in Pará state to the port of Ponta da Madeira in Maranhão state. If Bolsonaro’s plan to open RENCA and indigenous reserves to mining goes forward, then many new miles of track will be needed for commodities transport. Image courtesy of MA10.
Infrastructure to prepare the way
Should those mines go forward, they, like agribusiness, will require transport, particularly railways. In that regard, on 12 November, the Pará state government signed a memorandum of understanding to carry out a viability study for the Ferrovia Pará railway, known as Fepasa.
Fepasa would run in a roughly north-south direction, from Parauapebas in southeast Pará, through the town of Marabá on the Tocantins River, to the municipality of Barcarena just west of Belém near the Brazilian coast. The government’s aim: use Fepasa to transport ore and soy from the state’s interior for export via transatlantic vessels through the Amazon River estuary. Construction is slated to begin in 2021, but as yet, none of the impacted indigenous communities have been consulted as required by ILO Convention 169.
The railway is just one component of an ambitious infrastructure master plan to expand the region’s logistic capacity; those plans include the building of at least 20 new river ports, two thermoelectric power stations, and a transmission line running across Pará from north to south. It seems certain that the state’s rainforest could not long survive such an onslaught.
João Gomes, assistant director for the Amazonia Program for the Federation of Organs for Social and Educational Assistance (FASE), agrees that mining and agribusiness concentrate income with wealthy elites while having very serious socio-environmental impacts.
Here too governmental development plans face obstacles, especially environmental regulations. To get round those blocks, the administration is pushing a new bill (PL 3,729) through Congress. It would simplify the environmental evaluation and approval process, collapsing the present three-phase licensing process into just one. Such fast track bills have been produced before, but never to such a cooperative ruralist Congress.
An indigenous family in Brazil from the Tucuxi group. Image by Fábio Rodrigues Pozzebom / ABr CC BY 3.0 br.
Attacking science and indigenous peoples
The government is attacking the Amazon on other fronts too. Key scientific research bodies, such as the National Institute of Amazonia Research (INPA), and the Emilio Goeldi Museum in Pará, whose studies at times urged authorities to adopt tougher forest protection measures, have had their budgets severely reduced under Bolsonaro.
“Without being able to contract new staff to replace the large number of people who are retiring, our [scientific] institutions are losing brains, productive capacity, communication capacity and training expertise,” said Ana Luísa Albernaz, the Goeldi Museum director.
Archaeologists, too, are facing dramatic funding cuts which will jeopardize their work documenting the Amazon’s rich indigenous prehistory and stopping them from salvaging relics — also, importantly, those cuts prevent digs that could give cause for slowing infrastructure and mining projects.
The Bolsonaro administration has already weakened IBAMA and ICMBio, Brazil’s two main environmental protection agencies, and it has also taken steps to render FUNAI, the country’s indigenous affairs agency, virtually inoperative. Even though weakened in recent years, FUNAI had continued to provide invaluable support to indigenous communities and slowly carried on demarcating indigenous reserves.
All that is ending now. A serious blow for the agency was Bolsonaro’s decision in July to appoint Marcelo Augusto Xavier da Silva, a former police officer with strong connections to agribusiness, as FUNAI president.
Many indigenous leaders were horrified at the time, fearing that his appointment would sound the death knell for the agency. Today it seems their fears were justified.
In November, the Brazilian Association of Anthropologists (ABA) issued a press release in which it charged that FUNAI is now selecting personnel “without the minimum qualifications and legitimacy” to identify and demarcate indigenous land.
One example cited by ABA is the dismantling of two groups set up to identify and demarcate land for the Tuxi and the Pankará indigenous peoples, both inhabiting Pernambuco state in Brazil’s northeast. Bolsonaro’s FUNAI demanded, ABA said, that highly qualified people already chosen to staff those groups be replaced by “trustworthy anthropologists,” code it appears for people who the government trusts to do its bidding, according to critics.
Wajāpi indigenous people. The Bolsonaro government has largely disempowered FUNAI, Brazil’s indigenous affairs agency. Image courtesy of Agência Brasil.
In November, da Silva told FUNAI staff they were banned from visiting land that was in the process of being demarcated, thus barring them from carrying out the verification process that is their charter under the Constitution.
The Estado de S. Paulo newspaper strongly criticized this instruction, saying that “The decision, besides being at odds with FUNAI’s basic mission, which is to act in defense of indigenous rights, also infringes indigenous rights as set out in federal legislation.”
In December, FUNAI started replacing the heads of its regional posts. Eight new coordinators have been appointed so far. A retired Army colonel was chosen to head the office in Dourados in Mato Grosso do Sul, a state where there has been indigenous unrest and a high indigenous suicide rate for many years, likely due to the government’s failure to recognize the lands rights of the Guarani-Kaiowá. A former military officer has also been appointed to head the FUNAI office in Humaitá in Amazonas state. New FUNAI heads are expected to be appointed to all 39 regional offices by the end of January, 2020.
However, the new FUNAI president hasn’t been getting it all his own way. Indigenous organizations have been campaigning continuously and effectively in Brasilia against a proposed constitutional amendment (PEC 215/00) which would transfer authority for demarcating indigenous land from the executive branch, with FUNAI carrying out the studies and the Justice Ministry approving them, to the ruralist-dominated Congress.
Erisvan Guajajara, one of the indigenous leaders murdered in Brazil this year. Image courtesy of CIMI.
PEC 215/00 also includes the so-called “marco temporal,” which would establish an arbitrary cut-off date of 1988 as the year when indigenous groups must have been living on land for that property to be recognized today as theirs. In addition, it requires that non-indigenous Brazilians claiming and living on indigenous lands be paid compensation for any losses, not just for assets but also for the land itself, if forced to leave it.
Congress, through strongly ruralist, is still divided on the marco temporal issue, which requires a two-thirds majority to pass. Voting was postponed twice this year due to vociferous protests held in Brasília by indigenous people and quilombolas, communities of runaway slave descendants.
But far from the federal capital, Indians are paying a heavy price for the impunity with which land grabbers and landowners have operated this year. Seven indigenous leaders were assassinated in 2019, making it the deadliest year for indigenous leaders in two decades. Many analysts believe that things will only get worse in the years ahead if, and when, the mining companies move in.
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For the diamond industry in Canada's North, 2019 wasn't exactly a banner year.
"The diamond market has been suffering," wrote Tom Hoefer, the president of the NWT & Nunavut Chamber of Mines, in an email to CBC.
"Prices have been poor and below what we had wished for."
But on the other side of the Earth, the closure of one of the world's largest diamond mines is offering a glimmer of hope.
Rio Tinto's Argyle Mine in remote Western Australia is set to close at the end of 2020, and has already seen its production of top-quality diamonds wind down.
At its peak, the mine produced 90 per cent of the world's coveted pink diamonds and accounted for nearly 50 per cent of global production.
It's closure marks the end for yet another "legacy" diamond mine — part of a general trend of slowing production around the world, according to Paul Zimnisky, an independent diamond industry analyst.
You're going to see mines [that] maybe aren't economic now will be economic in years to come.- Paul Zimnisky, Independent diamond industry analyst
Some of those slowing mines are here in the North — including Rio Tinto's other property, the N.W.T.'s Diavik mine, scheduled to close in 2025.
But Zimnisky said declining global production could actually encourage diamond exploration by correcting a surge in supply that began in 2019.
"Diamond prices hit an all-time high in the first half of 2011, and that led to additional exploration and development ... including Gahcho Kué in the Northwest Territories," Zimnisky explained.
All that production depressed prices to the point where only "world-class" mines make economic sense, Zimnisky said — especially in Canada's North, with its high operating costs.
The Argyle Mine pit in remote Western Australia. The mine produced 90 per cent of the world's coloured diamonds, and accounted for almost 50 per cent of global diamond production at its peak. (Rio Tinto)
"The economics are ultimately what determines whether a new mine is brought online," or expansion projects go ahead, said Zimnisky.
And those economics have had a big impact on the northern mining industry.
In 2018, Dominion Diamond Mines suspended work on extending the life of its Ekati diamond mine while the company studied options to increase its profitability.
"There's very few new projects that are economic at current prices," said Zimnisky.
But Zimnisky says the closure of Argyle Mine, with its significant output, may mean that supply pressure is lessened — and less supply could mean higher prices.
"If we see prices go higher, I think you're going to see mines [that] maybe aren't economic now will be economic in years to come," said Zimnisky.
'Supply picture is bullish'
That doesn't mean it's time to throw a party yet.
"The supply picture is bullish for diamond prices," said Zimnisky. "I think the demand is kind of the tricky thing to figure out."
At the same time as supply was surging, marriage rates declined and synthetic diamonds improved in quality — factors which Zimnisky said could have contributed to a plateau in demand.
Efforts to extend the life of the N.W.T.'s Ekati diamond mine, pictured here, have been suspended amid a glut in global supply. (Dominion Diamond Corporation)
Tom Hoefer with the Chamber of Mines also points out that the Argyle mine was known for its production of coloured diamonds, not the white varieties mined in the North.
"So those niche diamond prices may rise, but [it] may not affect the predominant market of whites," he wrote.
For Hoefer, it's down to governments to attract investment, especially in the N.W.T., which he said has lagged behind other territories for "over 12 years now."
Settled land claims, greater regulatory certainty, and a new Mineral Development Strategy are all things he's looking for in 2020 to indicate a better future for diamond mines.
Rio Tinto, one of the world's largest mining companies, has "done well in Canada," Zimnisky says.
But even so, any new northern mine will have to be "a large enough asset to move the needle," he said.
SANTIAGO (Reuters) - Chilean mining activity fell 7.1% in November, government data showed on Tuesday, plagued in part by operational issues at major mines during a tumultuous month of protests, road and port blockades and worker strikes in the South American nation.
The world’s top copper producer reported that production of the metal fell 6.7% in November from the same month a year earlier to 504,366 tonnes. Government statistics agency INE noted the fall in mining activity was in part due to an unfavorable basis of comparison, a reflection of strong production the previous November.
Chile’s vast copper mines largely maintained production and kept operations running normally through early November, amid the brunt of unrest, though there have been isolated incidents at some operations and uncertainty lingers.
Chile´s Codelco COBRE.UL, the world’s top copper miner, and BHP (BHP.AX), which owns the sprawling Escondida copper mine, both reported increases in output in October despite riots that threw much of the country into chaos. November production figures for the mines are expected in early January.
But Chile´s Antofagasta (ANTO.L), another of the world´s top copper miners, warned in November of larger than anticipated impacts on output from the Chile protests.
MANUFACTURING UP
Chilean manufacturing production CLMFG=ECI in November surprised analysts, jumping 3.2 percent compared with the same month the previous year, according to government data, bucking predictions of a sharper drop in output.
The unexpected increase was driven primarily by a year-on-year rise in the production of chemical products, INE said.
Protests in Chile have led to at least 26 deaths and billions in losses to private businesses and public infrastructure. The prolonged demonstrations and sometimes violent riots and looting prompted the central bank last week to slash forecasts for growth, investment and demand through 2020.
Reporting by Dave Sherwood, editing by Louise Heavens and Nick Macfie
This rhetoric has fueled the invasion of Flona de Altamira, which was already under mounting pressure from widespread clearing in the surrounding area, Fonseca said. Deforestation by miners, cattle ranchers and loggers has been particularly relentless in the Floresta Nacional do Jamanxim, which lies just southwest of it.
“We have a lot of pressure here,” said Fonseca. “This region is very, very critical because we already have a lot of deforestation around it.”
Meanwhile, rising tin prices gave a further incentive to miners this year, encouraging them to invade the mineral-rich Flona de Altamira. In March 2019, global tin prices hit their highest in more than a year, aided by a large expected deficit and rising demand for the metal, which is used in a variety of products ranging from cell phones to toothpaste. Tin prices have since fallen, with smaller spikes in September and December.
But unlike gold mining, extracting tin ore is less costly and difficult, making the activity particularly attractive to speculators, according to local sources. Illegal miners – many of whom are impoverished, illiterate men – have flocked to Flona de Altamira with the hopes of striking it rich.
Across the Brazilian Amazon, there are more than 450 illegal mines in the Brazilian Amazon, according to the Rede Amazónica de Información Socioambiental Georreferenciada (RAISG), a consortium of civil society organizations. Thousands of illegal miners toil away at these sites, extracting resources like tin, gold and nickel.
“They see the Amazon as this huge place that must be exploited, that must be invaded,” said Danicley Aguiar, a senior campaigner with Greenpeace Brazil. “It’s a predatory economic model.”
Losing the battle
Authorities have been trying to combat illegal mining in Flona de Altamira for years – but the recent spike in activity signals they may be losing the war.
As budgets at environmental agencies have been slashed in recent years, the state’s presence in the region has been dramatically weakened. Ibama, ICMBio and Funai have been forced to reduce staff and shut posts in remote parts of Brazil, leaving illegal miners free to invade protected territories without fear of being detected.
More recent clearing at a mining site. Imagery from Planet Labs accessed through Global Forest Watch.
Environmental enforcement – already undermined by prior administrations – has further deteriorated under Bolsonaro’s watch. Fines for environmental crimes have plummeted since he assumed office to their lowest in a decade, and earlier this year the president stripped Ibama, the country’s main environment agency, of some of its powers.
Recently, Bolsonaro sent a further positive signal to miners and loggers when he personally stepped in to stop Ibama from destroying machinery seized during a raid on a protected territory in Roraima.
In Flona de Altamira, the reduced state presence has had a tangible impact. Environmental agents raided the protected area multiple times in 2016 and 2017, doling out fines and destroying equipment, sources said. Yet authorities stepped back from the area entirely in 2018 and returned this year only to find mining activity had surged back with renewed force.
Meanwhile, illegal miners have become bolder, as the Bolsonaro administration has signaled it may be on their side. In late October, they blocked several key highways in Pará and demanded that the government legalize their activity and stop enforcement agents from damaging mining equipment.
“When this type of rhetoric is put on the table, it’s only natural that garimpeiros will feel supported by the government in their activity,” Aguiar said. “It creates an expectation.”
Lost forests, polluted rivers
In recent months, Flona de Altamira has also seen a surge of deforestation driven by clandestine road-building and illegal agricultural development, as cattle ranchers convert more forest to pastures.
By comparison, mining generally accounts for far less forest destruction – but it can leave a profound imprint on ecosystems and water resources. In Flona de Altamira, local sources point to the surge in mining activity as a key contributor to the stark deterioration in the water quality of Rio Aruri.
Amazonian manatees live in Flona de Altamira and are threatened with extinction. Photo by Dirk Meyer via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).
While some tin ore can be found in ground rock, most easily accessible deposits are concentrated in streams and along river banks. When forest and topsoil are removed from shorelines for mineral extraction, soil and mining waste run unobstructed directly into the river when it rains.
Tin ore mines also use water from nearby rivers for hydraulic extraction and then dispose of the waste in mining ponds and tailings dams nearby. Research has linked highly toxic tin ore waste stored in tailings dams to dramatic pollution of soil, vegetation, surface water and groundwater.
In the case of gold mining, where mercury is often used in the extraction process, the impact on human and animal health can be devastating. Studies have linked exposure to the element to skin disease, infertility and birth defects. Mercury can also contaminate fish populations, travelling vast distances and amplifying in toxicity up the food chain.
The pollution entering Rio Aruri then flows further afield, contaminating other regions and communities. Notably, Rio Ariri connects with the larger Rio Jamanxim, an important river that winds through several protected areas, including Floresta Naciona de Itaituba and the Área de Proteção Ambiental do Jamanxim. A few kilometres upstream, Rio Jamanxim also flows into Rio Tapajós – a major tributary of the Amazon River.
Activists in the region also worry about the impact on neighboring protected areas, such as the Xipaya, Kuruayá and Bau indigenous territories. Across the Brazilian Amazon, some 18 indigenous territories have already been invaded by illegal miners, according to RAISG. “There’s huge pressure on indigenous lands from mining,” Aguiar said.
The region around Flona de Altamira is also home to river-dwelling and other traditional communities whose members harvest Brazil nuts within the forest. These communities often rely on the local rivers to fish and sustain their traditional lifestyles.
Conservationists and activists working in the area say the invasion of the region – and the pollution of the area’s water sources – can have detrimental impacts on the health and livelihoods of those dependent on the forest for survival.
“The problem is, when you contaminate the water, the impacts travel,” Aguiar said. “A mine has the power to impact thousands of people – it can affect generations.”
Banner image: Deforestation at an illegal cassiterite mining site in Flona de Altamira. Imagery from Planet Labs.
Editor’s note: This story was powered by Places to Watch, a Global Forest Watch (GFW) initiative designed to quickly identify concerning forest loss around the world and catalyze further investigation of these areas. Places to Watch draws on a combination of near-real-time satellite data, automated algorithms and field intelligence to identify new areas on a monthly basis. In partnership with Mongabay, GFW is supporting data-driven journalism by providing data and maps generated by Places to Watch. Mongabay maintains complete editorial independence over the stories reported using this data.
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Deal making in the Canadian gold sector went into overdrive in 2019 and industry players see that likely to continue in 2020, with smaller companies becoming targets as fund managers push the industry to create bigger, more diversified miners.
In 2019, $31.8-billion worth of gold-mining deals were announced, the largest on record for the Canadian gold sector, according to data from Refinitiv. Headline deals included Newmont Gold Corp.’s US$10-billion purchase of Goldcorp Inc., Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd.’s $4.9-billion bid for Detour Gold Corp. and China’s Zijin Mining Group Co. Ltd.'s planned acquisition of Canada’s Continental Gold Inc. for $1.4-billion.
The merger and acquisitions bonanza is being driven by a number of factors, including the need for companies to replace reserves, cut costs, increase production and attract more interest from institutional investors. The move toward lower-cost exchange-traded funds (ETFs) has pushed more money toward larger-cap companies that have membership in stock market indexes – and that, in turn, is giving larger miners an advantage on the cost of capital over larger ones.
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Given that, a number of gold industry watchers say there are still too many smaller mining companies competing for a limited pool of capital – a dynamic that’s expected to drive even more M&A in 2020.
“The industry is incredibly fragmented,” said Jon Case, precious metals portfolio manager with Sentry Inc. “There’s just too many single asset companies. It doesn’t make sense.“
Single asset miners – those with only one mine, or one development project – are seen as overly risky for many investors, Mr. Case said, and are being encouraged to find M&A suitors, as Detour Gold did with Kirkland Lake in 2019.
Canadian companies in that category that are seen as possible targets in 2020 are Pretium Resources Inc. and Sabina Gold and Silver Corp., both based in Vancouver.
The “bigger is better” mantra is also likely to motivate more deal making. The rapid growth of index-tracking ETFs means the bigger a company’s weighting is within a gold index, the more buying it gets – regardless of its fundamentals.
“It’s more important than ever to be big,“ said Peter Grosskopf, chief executive of Sprott Inc.
Against that backdrop, larger capitalization companies are trading at increasingly bigger stock premiums compared with smaller miners, and they end up with much lower costs of capital as a result.
Story continues below advertisement
“I’ve never seen – and I’ve been in the business for 30-plus years – as dramatic a difference as it became over the last year and a half,” Mr. Grosskopf said of the divergence in the cost of capital between large and small miners.
The last time the gold industry went through such an intense round of consolidation was about a decade ago. But many of those deals turned out badly, with companies overpaying for assets that never delivered anywhere close to their promise. Barrick Gold Corp.’s $7.3-billion acquisition of copper producer Equinox Minerals Ltd. and Kinross Gold Corp.’s US$7.1-billion acquisition of Red Back Mining Inc. are prime examples.
This time around, companies have at least been more disciplined when it comes to price. Takeover premiums have ranged from Barrick’s zero-premium acquisition of Randgold Resources, to Newmont’s slim 17-per-cent premium for Goldcorp, to Kirkland’s getting-up-there 24-per-cent premium for Detour.
While the ultimate success or failure of any individual M&A deal likely won’t be evident until a few years out, one thing is clear – the lower the takeover premium, the better the transactions have been received by the market.
In an online commentary in November, portfolio manager Joe Foster with New York-based Van Eck & Associates wrote that more gold companies should take a page out of the Barrick and Randgold playbook and consider teaming up in zero-premium mergers, rather than holding out for juicy premiums.
Looking at why more of these kinds of deals hadn’t materialized, Mr. Foster concluded that management teams are often more concerned about protecting their own jobs, rather than doing the right thing for shareholders.
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One of the few zero-premium deals announced in 2019 was Equinox Gold Corp.'s $770-million proposed merger with Leagold Mining Corp., which was warmly received by shareholders on both sides.
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The December 2019 report on the Bitcoin mining network from CoinShares Research, a division of the digital asset management firm, presented an industry in good health at the end of the year, with a hash rate that had almost doubled in the previous six months, a new generation of more powerful and efficient technology on the market and the continued use of sustainable, renewable energy.
The report indicated that, at this year’s average bitcoin price, fee ratio and block frequency, miners were on their way to making $5.4 billion in total revenue for 2019, down slightly from 2018, but significantly up from $3.4 billion accrued in 2017.
“Unlike the period leading up to our previous report, these last 6 months have been relatively calm in terms of large-scale structural changes,” per the report. “Whereas the period between November 2018 and June 2019 witnessed a large number of bankruptcies and capital transfers, the development of the last 6 months has been mainly one of expansion.”
As the bitcoin mining sphere builds on this positive momentum from the end of 2019 and heads into 2020, factors like the increasing hash rate, new hardware, the upcoming reward halving and more will determine how the industry, and Bitcoin in general, grows.
Good News for the Bitcoin Mining Hash Rate in 2020
CoinShares reported a “huge increase” in the mining hash rate which nearly doubled in the last six months from approximately 50 exahashes per second (EH/s) to almost 90 EH/s, having peaked at more than 100 EH/s.
The report attributed this increase to a combination of the availability of a new generation of more powerful, efficient mining equipment and strong average bitcoin prices.
In a recent episode of the What’s Halvening podcast, CoinShares Research Director Chris Bendiksen discussed the increase in hash rate, particularly from Chinese operations, which he said accounted for almost 70 percent of the increase. China now accounts for 65 percent of the global bitcoin mining hash rate.
Bendiksen noted that this increase in hash rate was largely the result of improved technology and, since most new mining computers are produced in China, Chinese miners were first in line in getting next generation technology upgrades.
He expects that, as new technology filters into the Western market, the hash rate there will rise as well.
He also noted that there were signs that as Chinese miners upgraded they were shipping their old Bitmain Antminer S9 mining hardware to places like Iran and Kazakhstan.
Blockstream CSO Samson Mow, whose company has mining operations in Quebec, Canada, and Adel, Georgia, agreed with Bendiksen’s optimistic outlook for 2020.
“Bitcoin’s network hashrate will keep climbing as miners switch out older equipment with newer and more efficient models,” Mow told Bitcoin Magazine.
Will China Continue to Dominate Bitcoin Mining in 2020?
As noted above, the CoinShares report indicated that “as much as 65% of Bitcoin hash power resides within China — the highest we’ve seen since we began our network monitoring in late 2017.”
Despite the growth of bitcoin mining around the world, in places like North America, Russia and the Middle East, China still dominates the industry. Some may view this as a concern, especially as the dominance appears poised to grow entering 2020, as it centralizes one of Bitcoin’s most critical industries.
For Mow’s part, China’s dominance is certainly something to note, but ultimately he believes it is “a non-issue.”
“I wouldn’t be concerned about China’s dominance in Bitcoin mining,” Mow said. “The main advantages of mining in China are faster setup times and lower initial CapEx which, along with closer proximity to where ASICs are assembled, have driven industry growth there … Now that we have mining infrastructure built up in North America, like with Blockstream’s mining operations and others, the CapEx advantages are less important, and we have the additional benefit of lower electricity costs.”
The CoinShares report noted that there has been a major “policy switch” on the part of China’s government, going from listing mining as an undesirable industry as recently as April 2019 to removing mining from this list completely (although bitcoin itself is still illegal).
Still, Mow does not see China’s dominance as a priority issue for 2020.
“Mining in China is still done by individuals and corporations, just as mining in North America or any other location,” Mow said. “Also, the concept of ‘Chinese hash rate’ is misleading because there are non-Chinese individuals and companies mining in China, just as there are Chinese miners in North America.”
How the 2020 Halving Will Impact Bitcoin Mining
For this article, Bitcoin Magazine reached out to a number of bitcoin mining industry leaders and CEOs about their priority issues for 2020. Several mentioned the upcoming Bitcoin halving (or “halvening”), expected in May 2020, as something to watch.
“The halving is going to be the most impactful factor to mining in 2020,” Andrew Kiguel, CEO of Hut 8 Mining, said. “All miners should be preparing for what happens and there are several possible outcomes. As the reward drops from 12.5 to 6.25 [BTC], less efficient miners will be forced to evaluate operations.”
Regarding bitcoin mining hardware, the CoinShares report indicated that “going into the reward halving in the spring of 2020, older gear such as the venerable Antminer S9, which is still widely deployed in the network, will likely be approaching the end of its useful lifetime unless the price of Bitcoin rises dramatically, or indeed if more operators gain access to electricity around or below ¢1/kWh.”
The bitcoin mining hash rate will be affected as well. On What’s Halvening, Bendiksen said that if the price of bitcoin stays about the same, “you will see a drawdown in the hash rate of 50 percent” with some companies closing down. But if the bitcoin price doubles, then the hash rate will be back to where it was.
When it comes to the halving and its impact on price, Mow remains optimistic.
“This upcoming halving will see the daily supply of bitcoin drop from 1,800 to 900,” he said. “With overall general awareness of Bitcoin being much higher, and exchange on-ramps being far more mature than four years ago, I’d expect to see a price increase — if not exactly at the time of the halving, then in the months to follow.”
Ultimately, the halving will impact all primary indicators of bitcoin mining in 2020: the equipment used, hash rate and price. But the extent to which the mining industry is affected is still to be determined.
“Will the network hash rate drop significantly after the halving?” Kiguel asked. “I believe it will, as miners using older equipment will no longer be viable. Will the price of bitcoin rally in response to the halving … or is it already priced in? I think we will see a bump in the price, however, perhaps not as high as some are expecting. Perhaps a 50 to 100 percent bump from current levels.”
Naturally, the halving and its expected impact is top of mind for every significant bitcoin miner as 2020 begins.
“In order to maintain current mining economics pre- and post-halving, BTC prices will need to increase substantially, or there will be a dramatic decline in network hash rates as higher cost miners unplug their hardware,” Bitfarms CEO Wes Fulford said. “Bitfarms is well positioned to withstand any short-term volatility in mining economics based on our low cost structure, access to competitively priced electricity and new generation mining fleet.”
Will Mining Technology Continue to Evolve in 2020?
Bendiksen noted on What’s Halvening that the evolution of mining technology is continuing at a pace greater than ever as mining hardware companies like Canaan and MicroBT are competing more closely with hardware giant Bitmain.
And as companies like Canaan and Bitmain apply for initial public offerings in the U.S., the hardware market will become even more decentralized in 2020.
In its report, CoinShares listed the main players in the manufacturing market at the end of 2019 as Bitmain, with its Antminer 15 and 17 series; MicroBT, with its Whatsminer 10 and 20 series; Bitfury, with its latest Clarke chipset; Canaan, with its Avalon 10 series; Innosilicon, with its T3 unit; and Ebang, with its E10 model.
“These new models produce as much as 5x the hashrate per unit as their generational predecessors, which means that even though on a unit-basis, several producers report solid sales of previous-generation models, on a hashrate-basis, Bitmain and MicroBT have delivered the vast majority of new capacity to the network,” according to the report.
It shouldn’t be a surprise that Fulford recognized the importance of using the latest and most efficient technology in 2019, which could set Bitfarms up to have an even more productive 2020.
“We added 13,300 new generation miners which has resulted in a 291 percent increase to computational hash power this year,” he said. “New-generation miners now represent 73 percent of our installed computing power which positions us as one of the most energy-efficient cryptocurrency miners in the public markets.”
“Throughout 2020 and going forward, we remain focused on running the most efficient hardware and maintaining extremely high power usage efficiency ratios, key fundamentals to maintaining operational profitability,” Plouton CEO Ramak J. Sedigh told Bitcoin Magazine.
But this investment in the latest technology does, of course, depend on the ongoing profitability of bitcoin mining in 2020. To this end, Sedigh explained that his biggest concern is whether bitcoin will be able to maintain a steady price.
“The case for any mining operation, and so the success of the industry, really is dependent on the stability of bitcoin,” Sedigh said. “We plan to survive the extended lows, but we need to keep higher averages so the traditional investors feel confident investing in bitcoin-related projects. To that end, my bigger concern is price manipulation, because at an estimated $150 billion total market cap, bitcoin is easy to manipulate through the exchanges, which contributes to volatility.”
Looking ahead to 2020, bitcoin mining will not be for the faint of heart, as price volatility is still a big unknown, CoinShares reported.
On What’s Halvening, Bendiksen marveled at the risk takers who are prepared to invest billions of dollars into bitcoin mining despite many question marks. Any risk analysis, he said, will tell you it's a high-risk enterprise and yet, based on the actions of its participants, bitcoin miners clearly have faith in bitcoin and the network.
The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.
Mining Lubricants market worldwide is projected to grow by US$727.4 Million, driven by a compounded growth of 4.3%. Mineral Oil Lubricants, one of the segments analyzed and sized in this study, displays the potential to grow at over 4.7%. The shifting dynamics supporting this growth makes it critical for businesses in this space to keep abreast of the changing pulse of the market. Poised to reach over US$2 Billion by the year 2025, Mineral Oil Lubricants will bring in healthy gains adding significant momentum to global growth.
- Representing the developed world, the United States will maintain a 3.3% growth momentum. Within Europe, which continues to remain an important element in the world economy, Germany will add over US$26.1 Million to the region's size and clout in the next 5 to 6 years. Over US$20.9 Million worth of projected demand in the region will come from Rest of Europe markets. In Japan, Mineral Oil Lubricants will reach a market size of US$112.5 Million by the close of the analysis period. As the world's second largest economy and the new game changer in global markets, China exhibits the potential to grow at 6.9% over the next couple of years and add approximately US$210.8 Million in terms of addressable opportunity for the picking by aspiring businesses and their astute leaders. Presented in visually rich graphics are these and many more need-to-know quantitative data important in ensuring quality of strategy decisions, be it entry into new markets or allocation of resources within a portfolio. Several macroeconomic factors and internal market forces will shape growth and development of demand patterns in emerging countries in Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Middle East. All research viewpoints presented are based on validated engagements from influencers in the market, whose opinions supersede all other research methodologies.
- Competitors identified in this market include, among others, Bel-Ray Company LLC; BP PLC; Chevron Corporation; ExxonMobil Corporation; Fuchs Petrolub SE; Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd.; Kluber Lubrication Munchen SE & Co. KG; LUKOIL Lubricants Company; PetroChina Co., Ltd.; Quaker Chemical Corporation; Royal Dutch Shell PLC; Schaeffer Manufacturing Company; Sinopec Corp.; Total SA; Whitmore
1. MARKET OVERVIEW
Global Competitor Market Shares
Mining Lubricants Competitor Market Share Scenario Worldwide
(in %): 2019 & 2025
2. FOCUS ON SELECT PLAYERS
3. MARKET TRENDS & DRIVERS
4. GLOBAL MARKET PERSPECTIVE
Table 1: Mining Lubricants Global Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2018-2025
Table 2: Mining Lubricants Global Retrospective Market Scenario
in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2009-2017
Table 3: Mining Lubricants Market Share Shift across Key
Geographies Worldwide: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 4: Mineral Oil Lubricants (Type) World Market by
Region/Country in US$ Million: 2018 to 2025
Table 5: Mineral Oil Lubricants (Type) Historic Market Analysis
by Region/Country in US$ Million: 2009 to 2017
Table 6: Mineral Oil Lubricants (Type) Market Share Breakdown
of Worldwide Sales by Region/Country: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 7: Synthetic Lubricants (Type) Potential Growth Markets
Worldwide in US$ Million: 2018 to 2025
Table 8: Synthetic Lubricants (Type) Historic Market
Perspective by Region/Country in US$ Million: 2009 to 2017
Table 9: Synthetic Lubricants (Type) Market Sales Breakdown by
Region/Country in Percentage: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 10: Coal Mining (End-Use Industry) Global Market
Estimates & Forecasts in US$ Million by Region/Country:
2018-2025
Table 11: Coal Mining (End-Use Industry) Retrospective Demand
Analysis in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2009-2017
Table 12: Coal Mining (End-Use Industry) Market Share Breakdown
by Region/Country: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 13: Iron Ore Mining (End-Use Industry) Demand Potential
Worldwide in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2018-2025
Table 14: Iron Ore Mining (End-Use Industry) Historic Sales
Analysis in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2009-2017
Table 15: Iron Ore Mining (End-Use Industry) Share Breakdown
Review by Region/Country: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 16: Bauxite Mining (End-Use Industry) Worldwide Latent
Demand Forecasts in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2018-2025
Table 17: Bauxite Mining (End-Use Industry) Global Historic
Analysis in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2009-2017
Table 18: Bauxite Mining (End-Use Industry) Distribution of
Global Sales by Region/Country: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 19: Other End-Use Industries (End-Use Industry) Sales
Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Million by Region/Country for
the Years 2018 through 2025
Table 20: Other End-Use Industries (End-Use Industry) Analysis
of Historic Sales in US$ Million by Region/Country for the
Years 2009 to 2017
Table 21: Other End-Use Industries (End-Use Industry) Global
Market Share Distribution by Region/Country for 2009, 2019, and
2025
III. MARKET ANALYSIS
GEOGRAPHIC MARKET ANALYSIS UNITED STATES
Market Facts & Figures
US Mining Lubricants Market Share (in %) by Company: 2019 & 2025
Table 22: United States Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Projections in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 23: Mining Lubricants Market in the United States by
Type: A Historic Review in US$ Million for 2009-2017
Table 24: United States Mining Lubricants Market Share
Breakdown by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 25: United States Mining Lubricants Latent Demand
Forecasts in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 26: Mining Lubricants Historic Demand Patterns in the United States by End-Use Industry in US$ Million for 2009-2017
Table 27: Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown in the United States by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 CANADA
Table 28: Canadian Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 29: Canadian Mining Lubricants Historic Market Review by
Type in US$ Million: 2009-2017
Table 30: Mining Lubricants Market in Canada: Percentage Share
Breakdown of Sales by Type for 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 31: Canadian Mining Lubricants Market Quantitative Demand
Analysis in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 32: Mining Lubricants Market in Canada: Summarization of
Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for
2009-2017
Table 33: Canadian Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 JAPAN
Table 34: Japanese Market for Mining Lubricants: Annual Sales
Estimates and Projections in US$ Million by Type for the Period
2018-2025
Table 35: Mining Lubricants Market in Japan: Historic Sales
Analysis in US$ Million by Type for the Period 2009-2017
Table 36: Japanese Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 37: Japanese Demand Estimates and Forecasts for Mining
Lubricants in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 38: Japanese Mining Lubricants Market in US$ Million by
End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 39: Mining Lubricants Market Share Shift in Japan by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 CHINA
Table 40: Chinese Mining Lubricants Market Growth Prospects in
US$ Million by Type for the Period 2018-2025
Table 41: Mining Lubricants Historic Market Analysis in China
in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 42: Chinese Mining Lubricants Market by Type: Percentage
Breakdown of Sales for 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 43: Chinese Demand for Mining Lubricants in US$ Million
by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 44: Mining Lubricants Market Review in China in US$
Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 45: Chinese Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 EUROPE
Market Facts & Figures
European Mining Lubricants Market: Competitor Market Share
Scenario (in %) for 2019 & 2025
Table 46: European Mining Lubricants Market Demand Scenario in
US$ Million by Region/Country: 2018-2025
Table 47: Mining Lubricants Market in Europe: A Historic Market
Perspective in US$ Million by Region/Country for the Period
2009-2017
Table 48: European Mining Lubricants Market Share Shift by
Region/Country: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 49: European Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018-2025
Table 50: Mining Lubricants Market in Europe in US$ Million by
Type: A Historic Review for the Period 2009-2017
Table 51: European Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 52: European Mining Lubricants Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018-2025
Table 53: Mining Lubricants Market in Europe: Summarization of
Historic Demand in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for the
Period 2009-2017
Table 54: European Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 FRANCE
Table 55: Mining Lubricants Market in France by Type: Estimates
and Projections in US$ Million for the Period 2018-2025
Table 56: French Mining Lubricants Historic Market Scenario in
US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 57: French Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 58: Mining Lubricants Quantitative Demand Analysis in France in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018-2025
Table 59: French Mining Lubricants Historic Market Review in
US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 60: French Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis: A
17-Year Perspective by End-Use Industry for 2009, 2019, and
2025 GERMANY
Table 61: Mining Lubricants Market in Germany: Recent Past,
Current and Future Analysis in US$ Million by Type for the
Period 2018-2025
Table 62: German Mining Lubricants Historic Market Analysis in
US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 63: German Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 64: Mining Lubricants Market in Germany: Annual Sales
Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for
the Period 2018-2025
Table 65: German Mining Lubricants Market in Retrospect in US$
Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 66: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in Germany by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 ITALY
Table 67: Italian Mining Lubricants Market Growth Prospects in
US$ Million by Type for the Period 2018-2025
Table 68: Mining Lubricants Historic Market Analysis in Italy
in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 69: Italian Mining Lubricants Market by Type: Percentage
Breakdown of Sales for 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 70: Italian Demand for Mining Lubricants in US$ Million
by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 71: Mining Lubricants Market Review in Italy in US$
Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 72: Italian Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 UNITED KINGDOM
Table 73: United Kingdom Market for Mining Lubricants: Annual
Sales Estimates and Projections in US$ Million by Type for the
Period 2018-2025
Table 74: Mining Lubricants Market in the United Kingdom:
Historic Sales Analysis in US$ Million by Type for the Period
2009-2017
Table 75: United Kingdom Mining Lubricants Market Share
Analysis by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 76: United Kingdom Demand Estimates and Forecasts for
Mining Lubricants in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to
2025
Table 77: United Kingdom Mining Lubricants Market in US$
Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 78: Mining Lubricants Market Share Shift in the United
Kingdom by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 SPAIN
Table 79: Spanish Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 80: Spanish Mining Lubricants Historic Market Review by
Type in US$ Million: 2009-2017
Table 81: Mining Lubricants Market in Spain: Percentage Share
Breakdown of Sales by Type for 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 82: Spanish Mining Lubricants Market Quantitative Demand
Analysis in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 83: Mining Lubricants Market in Spain: Summarization of
Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for
2009-2017
Table 84: Spanish Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 RUSSIA
Table 85: Russian Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Projections in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 86: Mining Lubricants Market in Russia by Type: A
Historic Review in US$ Million for 2009-2017
Table 87: Russian Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 88: Russian Mining Lubricants Latent Demand Forecasts in
US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 89: Mining Lubricants Historic Demand Patterns in Russia
by End-Use Industry in US$ Million for 2009-2017
Table 90: Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown in Russia by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
REST OF EUROPE
Table 91: Rest of Europe Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018-2025
Table 92: Mining Lubricants Market in Rest of Europe in US$
Million by Type: A Historic Review for the Period 2009-2017
Table 93: Rest of Europe Mining Lubricants Market Share
Breakdown by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 94: Rest of Europe Mining Lubricants Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018-2025
Table 95: Mining Lubricants Market in Rest of Europe:
Summarization of Historic Demand in US$ Million by End-Use
Industry for the Period 2009-2017
Table 96: Rest of Europe Mining Lubricants Market Share
Analysis by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 ASIA-PACIFIC
Table 97: Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2018-2025
Table 98: Mining Lubricants Market in Asia-Pacific: Historic
Market Analysis in US$ Million by Region/Country for the Period
2009-2017
Table 99: Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis
by Region/Country: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 100: Mining Lubricants Market in Asia-Pacific by Type:
Estimates and Projections in US$ Million for the Period
2018-2025
Table 101: Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Historic Market
Scenario in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 102: Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis
by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 103: Mining Lubricants Quantitative Demand Analysis in Asia-Pacific in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018-2025
Table 104: Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Historic Market
Review in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 105: Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Market Share
Analysis: A 17-Year Perspective by End-Use Industry for 2009,
2019, and 2025 AUSTRALIA
Table 106: Mining Lubricants Market in Australia: Recent Past,
Current and Future Analysis in US$ Million by Type for the
Period 2018-2025
Table 107: Australian Mining Lubricants Historic Market
Analysis in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 108: Australian Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown
by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 109: Mining Lubricants Market in Australia: Annual Sales
Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for
the Period 2018-2025
Table 110: Australian Mining Lubricants Market in Retrospect in
US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 111: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in Australia by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 INDIA
Table 112: Indian Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 113: Indian Mining Lubricants Historic Market Review by
Type in US$ Million: 2009-2017
Table 114: Mining Lubricants Market in India: Percentage Share
Breakdown of Sales by Type for 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 115: Indian Mining Lubricants Market Quantitative Demand
Analysis in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 116: Mining Lubricants Market in India: Summarization of
Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for
2009-2017
Table 117: Indian Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 SOUTH KOREA
Table 118: Mining Lubricants Market in South Korea: Recent
Past, Current and Future Analysis in US$ Million by Type for
the Period 2018-2025
Table 119: South Korean Mining Lubricants Historic Market
Analysis in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 120: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in South
Korea by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 121: Mining Lubricants Market in South Korea: Recent
Past, Current and Future Analysis in US$ Million by End-Use
Industry for the Period 2018-2025
Table 122: South Korean Mining Lubricants Historic Market
Analysis in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 123: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in South
Korea by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
REST OF ASIA-PACIFIC
Table 124: Rest of Asia-Pacific Market for Mining Lubricants:
Annual Sales Estimates and Projections in US$ Million by Type
for the Period 2018-2025
Table 125: Mining Lubricants Market in Rest of Asia-Pacific:
Historic Sales Analysis in US$ Million by Type for the Period
2009-2017
Table 126: Rest of Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Market Share
Analysis by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 127: Rest of Asia-Pacific Demand Estimates and Forecasts
for Mining Lubricants in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018
to 2025
Table 128: Rest of Asia-Pacific Mining Lubricants Market in US$
Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 129: Mining Lubricants Market Share Shift in Rest of Asia-Pacific by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 LATIN AMERICA
Table 130: Latin American Mining Lubricants Market Trends by
Region/Country in US$ Million: 2018-2025
Table 131: Mining Lubricants Market in Latin America in US$
Million by Region/Country: A Historic Perspective for the
Period 2009-2017
Table 132: Latin American Mining Lubricants Market Percentage
Breakdown of Sales by Region/Country: 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 133: Latin American Mining Lubricants Market Growth
Prospects in US$ Million by Type for the Period 2018-2025
Table 134: Mining Lubricants Historic Market Analysis in Latin
America in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 135: Latin American Mining Lubricants Market by Type:
Percentage Breakdown of Sales for 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 136: Latin American Demand for Mining Lubricants in US$
Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 137: Mining Lubricants Market Review in Latin America in
US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 138: Latin American Mining Lubricants Market Share
Breakdown by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 ARGENTINA
Table 139: Argentinean Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018-2025
Table 140: Mining Lubricants Market in Argentina in US$ Million
by Type: A Historic Review for the Period 2009-2017
Table 141: Argentinean Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown
by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 142: Argentinean Mining Lubricants Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018-2025
Table 143: Mining Lubricants Market in Argentina: Summarization
of Historic Demand in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for the
Period 2009-2017
Table 144: Argentinean Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis
by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 BRAZIL
Table 145: Mining Lubricants Market in Brazil by Type:
Estimates and Projections in US$ Million for the Period
2018-2025
Table 146: Brazilian Mining Lubricants Historic Market Scenario
in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 147: Brazilian Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 148: Mining Lubricants Quantitative Demand Analysis in Brazil in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018-2025
Table 149: Brazilian Mining Lubricants Historic Market Review
in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 150: Brazilian Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis: A
17-Year Perspective by End-Use Industry for 2009, 2019, and
2025 MEXICO
Table 151: Mining Lubricants Market in Mexico: Recent Past,
Current and Future Analysis in US$ Million by Type for the
Period 2018-2025
Table 152: Mexican Mining Lubricants Historic Market Analysis
in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 153: Mexican Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 154: Mining Lubricants Market in Mexico: Annual Sales
Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for
the Period 2018-2025
Table 155: Mexican Mining Lubricants Market in Retrospect in
US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 156: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in Mexico by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
REST OF LATIN AMERICA
Table 157: Rest of Latin America Mining Lubricants Market
Estimates and Projections in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 158: Mining Lubricants Market in Rest of Latin America by
Type: A Historic Review in US$ Million for 2009-2017
Table 159: Rest of Latin America Mining Lubricants Market Share
Breakdown by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 160: Rest of Latin America Mining Lubricants Latent
Demand Forecasts in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to
2025
Table 161: Mining Lubricants Historic Demand Patterns in Rest
of Latin America by End-Use Industry in US$ Million for
2009-2017
Table 162: Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown in Rest of Latin America by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 MIDDLE EAST
Table 163: The Middle East Mining Lubricants Market Estimates
and Forecasts in US$ Million by Region/Country: 2018-2025
Table 164: Mining Lubricants Market in the Middle East by
Region/Country in US$ Million: 2009-2017
Table 165: The Middle East Mining Lubricants Market Share
Breakdown by Region/Country: 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 166: The Middle East Mining Lubricants Market Estimates
and Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 167: The Middle East Mining Lubricants Historic Market
by Type in US$ Million: 2009-2017
Table 168: Mining Lubricants Market in the Middle East:
Percentage Share Breakdown of Sales by Type for 2009, 2019,
and 2025
Table 169: The Middle East Mining Lubricants Market
Quantitative Demand Analysis in US$ Million by End-Use
Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 170: Mining Lubricants Market in the Middle East:
Summarization of Historic Demand Patterns in US$ Million by
End-Use Industry for 2009-2017
Table 171: The Middle East Mining Lubricants Market Share
Analysis by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 IRAN
Table 172: Iranian Market for Mining Lubricants: Annual Sales
Estimates and Projections in US$ Million by Type for the Period
2018-2025
Table 173: Mining Lubricants Market in Iran: Historic Sales
Analysis in US$ Million by Type for the Period 2009-2017
Table 174: Iranian Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 175: Iranian Demand Estimates and Forecasts for Mining
Lubricants in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 176: Iranian Mining Lubricants Market in US$ Million by
End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 177: Mining Lubricants Market Share Shift in Iran by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 ISRAEL
Table 178: Israeli Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Forecasts in US$ Million by Type: 2018-2025
Table 179: Mining Lubricants Market in Israel in US$ Million by
Type: A Historic Review for the Period 2009-2017
Table 180: Israeli Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 181: Israeli Mining Lubricants Addressable Market
Opportunity in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018-2025
Table 182: Mining Lubricants Market in Israel: Summarization of
Historic Demand in US$ Million by End-Use Industry for the
Period 2009-2017
Table 183: Israeli Mining Lubricants Market Share Analysis by
End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 SAUDI ARABIA
Table 184: Saudi Arabian Mining Lubricants Market Growth
Prospects in US$ Million by Type for the Period 2018-2025
Table 185: Mining Lubricants Historic Market Analysis in Saudi
Arabia in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 186: Saudi Arabian Mining Lubricants Market by Type:
Percentage Breakdown of Sales for 2009, 2019, and 2025
Table 187: Saudi Arabian Demand for Mining Lubricants in US$
Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 188: Mining Lubricants Market Review in Saudi Arabia in
US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 189: Saudi Arabian Mining Lubricants Market Share
Breakdown by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Table 190: Mining Lubricants Market in the United Arab
Emirates: Recent Past, Current and Future Analysis in US$
Million by Type for the Period 2018-2025
Table 191: United Arab Emirates Mining Lubricants Historic
Market Analysis in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 192: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in United Arab Emirates by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 193: Mining Lubricants Market in the United Arab
Emirates: Recent Past, Current and Future Analysis in US$
Million by End-Use Industry for the Period 2018-2025
Table 194: United Arab Emirates Mining Lubricants Historic
Market Analysis in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 195: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in United Arab Emirates by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
REST OF MIDDLE EAST
Table 196: Mining Lubricants Market in Rest of Middle East:
Recent Past, Current and Future Analysis in US$ Million by Type
for the Period 2018-2025
Table 197: Rest of Middle East Mining Lubricants Historic
Market Analysis in US$ Million by Type: 2009-2017
Table 198: Rest of Middle East Mining Lubricants Market Share
Breakdown by Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 199: Mining Lubricants Market in Rest of Middle East:
Annual Sales Estimates and Forecasts in US$ Million by End-Use
Industry for the Period 2018-2025
Table 200: Rest of Middle East Mining Lubricants Market in
Retrospect in US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2009-2017
Table 201: Mining Lubricants Market Share Distribution in Rest
of Middle East by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025 AFRICA
Table 202: African Mining Lubricants Market Estimates and
Projections in US$ Million by Type: 2018 to 2025
Table 203: Mining Lubricants Market in Africa by Type: A
Historic Review in US$ Million for 2009-2017
Table 204: African Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown by
Type: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
Table 205: African Mining Lubricants Latent Demand Forecasts in
US$ Million by End-Use Industry: 2018 to 2025
Table 206: Mining Lubricants Historic Demand Patterns in Africa
by End-Use Industry in US$ Million for 2009-2017
Table 207: Mining Lubricants Market Share Breakdown in Africa
by End-Use Industry: 2009 VS 2019 VS 2025
IV. COMPETITION
BP PLC
BEL-RAY COMPANY
CHEVRON CORPORATION
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION
FUCHS PETROLUB SE
IDEMITSU KOSAN
KLÜBER LUBRICATION MÜNCHEN SE & CO. KG
LUKOIL LUBRICANTS COMPANY
PETROCHINA
QUAKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC
SCHAEFFER MANUFACTURING COMPANY
SINOPEC CORPORATION
TOTAL SA
WHITMORE
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